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Abstract:  Woodruff (2017) has compiled a convincing array of data to support his contention that 
teleost fish feel pain. However, in the absence of an explanatory theory about the nature and 
function of consciousness, a checklist of criteria is insufficient to allay skeptical concerns. I offer a 
theory that can explain why features like selective attention and behavioral flexibility indicate 
consciousness. Consciousness represents the present moment in order to allow dynamic changes 
in actions or goals in response to situational demands. 
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Woodruff (2017) has compiled a convincing array of data to support his contention that teleost fish feel 
pain. The anatomical structures that underlie consciousness include the optic tectum for selective 
attention and the integration of sensory information. The pallium is shown to support re-entrant 
processing, necessary for the coordination of multi-modal systems in order to respond flexibly to a 
dynamic environment. The columnar network of the pallium supports local recurrent connections involved 
in sensory binding. Systems that perform affective and motivational functions are demonstrated. Learning 
and memory also occur in teleost fish. 
 
Who needs a theory? The primary reason I find all of this convincing is that it fits neatly into a theory of 
consciousness that explains why these structures are necessary. In my view, consciousness represents the 
present moment in order to facilitate flexible responses (Droege 2009, 2012). In a moment I will explain 
this view and how Woodruff’s data fit it so well, but my main point is to emphasize the importance of 
philosophical theory in general. 
 In the absence of a theory about the nature and function of consciousness, there is always the 
possibility that the proposed structures could be in place and yet not be conscious. Skeptics can deny the 
Animal Sentience 2017.063:  Droege on Woodruff on Fish Feel 
2 
 
ability of any objective evidence of consciousness (Nagel 1974). Or the particular structures may be 
considered insufficient in the absence of subjective report (Carruthers 2000). Or the homology between 
animal physiology and human physiology may be disputed (Key 2016; Rose et al. 2014). 
 Furthermore, there may be animals (or robots) capable of consciousness without the proposed 
structures. Perhaps selective attention and recurrent networks are not required for consciousness. 
Without a philosophical theory of consciousness, there is no way to address these concerns. 
 None of this is Woodruff’s job. As a scientist, he has identified criteria that various consciousness 
researchers have proposed and provided evidence that teleost fish satisfy those criteria. It is the job of 
philosophers to provide better arguments that these criteria are indeed appropriate conditions for 
consciousness. 
 
The function of consciousness is to track time. So, as a philosopher, let me do my part to place Woodruff’s 
criteria into a frame of explanation. When we are conscious of something, we take it to be occurring now, 
in this moment. We do not consciously experience the past or future except in a special way that deserves 
separate treatment (Droege 2013). Consciousness in itself is not necessary for effective response, since 
unconscious habits guide so much of behavior. Consciousness is only necessary to be able to flexibly 
respond, that is, to respond differently to a situation in order to achieve a goal. Consciousness allows 
dynamic changes in action or goal in response to situational demands. 
 With just this tiny bit of theory, the structures Woodruff describes slot together to form a coherent 
picture of teleost consciousness. Selective attention is necessary to filter out sensory information that is 
irrelevant to the current goal. Consciousness is keeping track of how things are at the present moment so 
that behavior can be tuned to the task at hand while remaining alert to new opportunities and obstacles. 
Relevant sensory information is integrated temporally to assess the ongoing coordination of actions and 
events. Reentrant processing and recurrent networks are important to binding discretely processed 
sensations into objects and binding temporally asynchronous signals into a conscious representation of 
the present moment. Affective and motivational systems contribute to the feeling of consciousness. 
Without pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, there would be no reason to pursue one goal rather than 
another, no reason to learn or remember associations. Arguably non-conscious animals utilize similar 
systems to respond to stimuli, so they are not sufficient evidence of consciousness in themselves. 
Nonetheless, they are necessary to consciousness and so are among the criteria to be evaluated. 
 This last point raises another issue to keep in mind when assessing animal consciousness. Even 
with an explanatory theory in place, there is reason to be cautious about specifying necessary and 
sufficient conditions. I have given reasons to think several conditions are necessary to consciousness. Much 
more argument would be needed to determine whether they are jointly sufficient in every case and 
whether there might be a case where a condition is missing. Rather than pursue this ideal of logical 
completeness in a philosophical vacuum, I recommend a more pragmatic approach. Philosophical theories 
about the nature and function of consciousness should be sensitive to empirical evidence from 
neuroscience and comparative ethology. In turn, empirical evidence should be evaluated in light of the 
best philosophical theories of consciousness. This joint method of problem-solving is the only way to move 
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